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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to demonstrate a need to expand the simple
Fisherian view whereby changes in interest rates are explained largely
by changes in expected inflation. It presents and tests a model of
expected, after—tax real interest rate behavior which, together with
a group of explanatory variables suggested by a structural model, takes
full account of implications of a broad range of U.S. tax code provisions
for behavior of interest rates. Determinants of interest rate volatility
are also investigated.
The model and results of empirical testing suggest:(1) why the
measured impact on interest rates of changes in anticipated inflation
has been below levels anticipated by many investigators; (2) how the
measured impact on interest rates of explanatory variables is conditional
on tax rates which may change over time; (3) larger than expected fiscal
deficits have a moderate positive impact on interest rates (40 basis
points per 100 billion annual rise for three—month Treasury bills) while
lower than expected money growth may also raise interest rates (as iri the
second quarter of 1981 when it did so by an estimated 24 basis points);
(4) inflation uncertainty produces no significant impact on interest
rates due to the econometric effect of including a measure of excess
capacity; (5) an unexpected rise in money demand may be responsible for
persistently higher interest rates during the first half of 1982 but
during most of the 1960—82 period money supply shocks had a more powerful
impact on interest rates.
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I.Introduction
This paper analyzes the major forces affecting the behavior of
interest rates, with particular emphasis on the unusually high ieves
and variability of rates in recent years. The approach is eclectic
in the sense that strong prior views are not allowed to rule Out consid-
eration of any possible avenue of investigation that might hel. to
explain unusual interest rate movements.
As Irving Fisher theorized a long time ago, the market interest rate
(hereafter, the interest rate) on a security maturing in flt" periods
of time is approximately the sum of an expected real rate (hereafter,
the real rate) and the level of inflation expected over "t" periodE.
A change in the level or the volatility of interest rates should thus
arise from (a) a change in the level or the volatility of the real rate;
(b) a change in the level or the volatility of expected infl'tion; c'
(c) a change in the impact that unit changes in either or both of these
variables has on interest rates.
In fact, it has been difficult to explain fully the behavior of
interest rates for two reasons. First, econometric models estimated
*John H. Makin, a consultant in the Fiscal Affairs Department of the
International Monetary Fund at the time this paper was written, is
Professor of Economics at the University of Washington and a Research
Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Vito Tanzi is
Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund.—2—
for a particular sample period have tended to perform poorly outside
of the sample period. Second, since both expected inflation and the
real rate are unobservable variables, attribution of movements in
interest rates to either of these components has depended crucially on
the use of proxies to represent their behavior. The latter problem has
been highlighted recently, when efforts to slow money growth at a time
when actual and expected fiscal deficits are growing, have resulted in
higher real rates, slowdowns in economic activity and in currency
appreciation. Furthermore, contrary to a considerable body of economic
theory, it appears that the real rate may be quite responsive over more
than the very short run (say, one quarter) to monetary and fiscal policy
actions and/or to fluctuations in economic activity.
The possible relationship between the configuration of monetary and
fiscal policy and the real rate has had a significant impact on analysis
of costs attributed to measures aimed at controlling inflation (see
Makin, 1982b). Based on conventional macroeconomic theory, it would be
considered unusual to hear calls for tax increases or cuts in government
spending in the midst of a serious recession. Yet such calls have been
heard with increasing frequency since the onset of the U.S. recession
in the summer of 1981, and, indeed, in the summer of 1982 there was a
major tax increase in the United States. The usual arguments for pump—
priming measures aimed at ending recessions have become less convincing
amid widespread concern that fiscal deficits, both actual and projected,
have been responsible for the high real rates that have depressed U.S.
expenditure on new plant and equipment, housing, and durables. The—3—
possible "crowding—out" of private investment by large government
borrowing requirements to finance large fiscal deficits is at the core
of the ongoing debate over the effects of a tight—money, loose—fiscal
configuration of macropolicy.
Another element to be considered in the investigation of interest
rate movements is the role played by taxes. Changes in actual or
perceived tax rates on interest income from financial instruments,
relative to tax rates on incomes from alternative assets, should affect
the relationship between nominal interest rates and real interest rates,
given the level of expected inflation. This means that when actual or
perceived marginal tax rates change, empirical models estimated over a
given sample period may break down outside of that period even when the
other variables needed to explain interest rates are identified and
accurately predicted.
Empirical investigations of interest rate behavior through the
mid—1970s by Tanzi (1980a) and Levi and Makin (1979) suggest that
investors tended to adjust interest rates to insulate, to a large extent,
real rates from the effects of expected inflation but not of income
taxes. This "fiscal illusion" (Tanzi, 1980a) may be expected to have
disappeared for several reasons. First, the high rates of inflation in
recent years would inevitably make the effect of taxes on real rates
obvious to most investors. These effects are far less obvious when
inflation is low. Second, these tax effects were discussed In several
well—known articles, such as those by Darby(1975),Feldstein (1976),
and Tanzi (1976). ThIrd, as inflation rates climbed, a combination of—4—
"bracket—creep" and higher interest rates tended to enlarge the absolute
gap between before—tax and after—tax real interest income, while simul-
taneously enhancing the attractiveness of returns on reai assets that
may be subject to only low capital gains tax rates (and only upon
realization) or to no tax at all, as is true for many collectibles and
antiques (Tanzi, 1982a and 1982b). As expected inflation rose, expected
after—tax real interest rates quickly became negative when allowance was
made for t.axation of nominal interest earning.
Section II of this paper briefly describes a framework for proximate
analysis of interest rate behavior. Section III considers in more detail
the role of expected inflation. A theoretical framework for analysis of
real rates is developed in Section IV. Section V presents results of
some empirical tests. Section VI discusses remaining puzzles concerning
behavior of interest rates. Section VII presents some concluding remarks
and summarizes suggestions for future investigation.
II. Proximate Sources of Interest Rate Movements
The Fisher equation describing an interest rate, i, in terms of
a real rate, r, and expected inflationis written as 1/
=rt+ (1)
where the subscript t indicates time. When taxes are considered, the




1/ The interaction term rtlTt is ignored here, since it is rela-
tively small in the United States.—5—
where tisthe perceived marginal tax rate on nominal interest income.
Transposing equation (2) to place i on the left—hand side,
(J_) [r+ (3)
1— t
Equation(3) summarizes the proximate determinants of the interest
rate discussed earlier. Movements in i can be decomposed into move—
inents in after—tax real returns, changes in expected inflation, and/or
changes in tax rates that alter the impact on I of given changes in r*
or T.Thesethree sources of movements in I, together with some
modifications that arise from more detailed consideration of determinants
of the after—tax real rate, will be explored in turn. It is, however,
immediately evident from equation (3) that, for a given level of expected
inflation, the provisions of the U.S. Ecopomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
will elevate observed interest rates, since accelerated depreciation
allowances should raise the expected after—tax real returns oninvest-
ment projects. However, the impact of such a rise in r* would be
somewhat diminished by reduced marginal individual income tax rates,
particularly in higher tax brackets, which will lower T.
Asfor interest rate volatility, an expression for the variance of
interest rates based on equation (3) is given by
=[1/(l.r)]2Y*+ [l/(l-t)]2 (4)
+ 2[l/(l—T)]2 Pr* °r*it
where denotes the variance of anticipated inflation, the
variance of the after—tax real rate and )r*v is the coefficient—6—
of correlation between r* and IT.Noticethat, when taxes are ignored
as in equation (1), the variance of i is written as
2 2 2++ 2Pr*ar* (5)
it
Theeffects of considering tax rates are evident ihen equations (4)
and (5) are compared. Ignoring the effects of possible correlation
between r* and it(Pr*
=0for now), the volatility of after—tax
real rates unambiguously produces more volatility in i, since for any
it>0 [11(1—it)]2 > 1.[Given it= 0.35,[11(1—it)]2 =2.37].
Given an average tax rate of 35 per cent on interest income, a rise of 1
per cent in the variance of the after—tax real rate raises the variance
of i by 2.37 times the effect of a rise in the variance of the real rate
when taxes are ignored as in equation (5). urthermore, the higher is
it,thegreater will be the volatility of i, ceteris paribus. Of
course, this argument assumes that there is no fiscal illusion, so that
tax effects are fully recognized by investors. 1/ Uncertainty over
future tax polIcy can have a powerful Impact on the observed v.1atilIty
of I. Equation (4) suggests also that the effects of a rise in the
variance of expected inflation on the observed variance of I will be
magnified.
It will be seen in the detailed discussion of real rates that
theoretical considerations (the Mundell—Tobin effect) suggest a
negative correlation between expected inflation and the real rate
1/ Thus If it is true that in the past two to three years fiscal
illusion has disappeared, equation (4) would go a long way toward
explaining the greater volatility of interest rates that has prevailed
in this period relative to earlier periods.(r0).Strong evidence for this effect is found in Fama and
Gibbons (1982) and Makin (1983). Such an effect produces some damping
of the effect of changes in the variance of real rates and variance of
expected inflation in both tax and nontax cases, but the damping effect
is reduced by consideration of tax effects for almost any conceivable
value of relevant parameters. 1/
Consideration of the proximate sources of interest rate movements
suggests a number of avenues for an explanation of high and volatile
interest rates. These include determinants of inflationary expectations,
after—tax real rates, and possible changes in actual or perceived
marginal tax rates on financial assets and alternative assets.





when tax rates are considered and, ignoring taxes, by
i2jr2* =2(1+
Forr =0.35;Pr* =— 0.25;the first of these equations equals 3.55
11
whilethe second equals 2.6.—8—
III. Behavior of Expected Inflation
Survey data on inflationary expectations provide a rich source
of information on the outlook regarding the level .nd stability of the
value of nominal contracts whose prices determine interest rates. As
already discusèed, the level of expected inflation is a major determi—
nant of the level of interest rates. Since expectations aboit inflation
are of necessity predictions, it is also relevant to consider the
implications for interest rate behavior of the dispersion of such views
about their mean value as well as of the symmetry of such dispersion
above and below the mean. It is useful to consider the variance and
skewness of expected inflation as well as its mean.
The variance across expectations of inflation held by survey
respondents may either be taken at face value as an index of the cisper—
sion of views on the outlook for inflation or as a measure of uncertthty
about inflation. The latter concept relates to the uncertainty attached
to the single—valued forecast given by a respondent who is asked simply
to describe his expectation regarding some future price level relative
to today's. An individual may give the same response, say ishown
in Figure 1, at two points in time. However, distribution A in Figure 1
represents a forecast given with more certainty, hence with a higher
probability, A, attached to than does distribution B. There the
probability attached to ,whichremains as in distribution A the





Uncertainty ;.out inflation both across survey respondents and by
Individual investors may be linked as follows. If investors form their
ownexpectationsregarding inflation by sampling the outlook of fore-
casters, as does the Livingston survey of inflationary expectations,
they will be more uncertain as to the outlook for Inflation as they
discover an increase In the dispersion of outlooks across forecasters.
Based on this reasoning, we shall employ the variance of the Livingston
survey of inflationary expectations as a measure of the uncertainty
about inflation.
The sign of the impact of changes in inflation uncertainty on
observable Interest rates is not clear. It operates through an impact
on the equilibrium after—tax real rate which adjusts to equilibrate real
saving and investment. 1/ A rise In uncertainty about inflatIon will
cause risk—averse investors, contracting to pay money to finance
projects, to reduce investment because of elevated uncertainty sur-
rounding the real value of contractual payments. Cukierman and
Wachtei (1982) have shown that relative price uncertainty tends to rise
with inflation uncertainty; this result, in turn, will reduce real
Investment, which after all represents a commitment to a given expected
set of relative prices. Downward pressure on real Investment schedule will,
ceteris paribus, cause the expected after—tax real rate to fall. At the
same time, however, on the other side of the market, risk—averse savers
contracting to receive dollars, will, because of elevated uncertainty
regarding the real value of contractual receipts, reduce the supply of
1/ This discussion Is drawn from Makln (1983).— 10—
fundsat given levels of income and real balances. This will, ceteris
paribus, cause the expected after—tax real rate to rise. The net impact
on the expected after—tax real rate the netive shift 1;. real
investment and real saving schedules is uncertai f the negative
impact on investment dominates, higher uncertair::y about inflation
depresses the equilibrium after—tax real rate -id thereby the nominal
rate. The reverse holds true if the negative impact of uncertainty
about inflation on saving dominates. Results reported below, although
statistically weak, suggest tnat higher :-itrtainty about inflation
tends to depress short—term nominal interest rates, suggesting that the
negative impact on investment dominates the negative impact on saving. 1/
1/ Hartman and Makin (1982) employ a utility—maximizing framework in
a two—period model to develop an alternative rationale for the proposi-
tion that uncertainty about inflation has a negative impact c'-'the
nominal rate. The approach yields a definition of the after—tax real
rate:
it(l—t) —t+ a2 (2a)
which implies:
+ —x2(mct_imP (lUa)
—(l+X3)a + X4X —®X2time + V]
In equation (lOa) the coefficient on a is negative even if A3
is negative and less than unity in absolute value with the impact oft2
on saving dominating that on investment. In short, though the expectation
of a negative impact of a2 on I is enhanced, it may not be due to te
impact on savings versus investment but rather to the alternative defini-
tion of the after—tax real rate given by equation (2a).— 11—
Itis also possible that the asymmetry (skewness) of views about
the outlook for inflation may affect the level of interest rates.
Suppose that the probability distribution for a typical respondent
X is as described by A in Figure 2; in other words, the respondent
considers 1T]C as the most likely outcome, but he also considers that
outcomes that imply expectations lower than x are more likely than
those implying expectations higher than i. Assume that while the
most likely outcome remains n,, the shape of the probability distribu-
tion changes from A to B, from negatively skewed to positively skewed,
so that outcomes implying inflation higher than ir, become more likely.
Although the reply that the respondent will give to the pollster would
remain unchanged (and equal to hisattitude as a lender or
borrower would certainly change. As a lender, he will now expect to
receive a higher rate of interest to compensate him for the higher risk.
As a borrower, he will be willing to pay a higher rate. The net effect
will be an increase in the market rate of Interest. Therefore, given
the average level and variance of expected inflation, the more positively
skewed are such expectations the higher is the rate of interest likely
to be. 1/
Since 1981, two important considerations have been paramount in the
minds of sophisticated investors. First, as the money supply was being
expanded at a slower pace, the expectation was for the rate of inflation
to fall. Second, as a growing fiscal deficit loomed large on the horizon,
one significant probability was that the Federal Reserve would, at some
1/ See also Fama (1976).— 12—
point,reverse its policy in order to accommodate the fiscal deficit
with monetary expansion. Under these circumstances, it seems safe to
assume that, for many observers, while the point estimate of inflation
(' in Figure 2) was falling, that fall was accompanied by a positive
change in the skewness of the probability distribution describing expected
inflation represented by the change from A to B. As a consequence, a
lower observed itmightnot be accompanied by as great a fall in the
nominal rate of interest, as we would have expected. Therefore, this
effect would be reflected in a higher real rate. Unfortunately, we do
not have data that would permit an empirical verification of this effect,
and it will have to be left in the realm of theoretical speculation. 1/
While we do not have information about the skewness of the proba-
bility distribution for each of the respondents in the Livingston sample,
we do have information about the variance across survey respondents on
expected inflation. Table 1 reports the mean level and standard deviation
of inflation forecasts from 1973 through the end of 1981 in the Livingston
survey. The December 1981 forecast, of course, covers the firsthalf of
1982. The steady rise of the mean until mid—1980 is consistent with
steady upward pressure on the level of interest rates until that time.
After that time, and particularly during 1981, the 3.5 per cent drop in
the mean level of expected inflation clearly suggests that, if real
(after—tax) rates had remained constant, by December 1981 short—term
interest rates should have been between about 3.5 per cent and 5.5 per
1/ Furthermore, the argument is likely to be more important for








Table1. Mean and Standard Deviation of Six—Month




July 1973 4.00 1.31
December1973 5.17 2.10
June 1974 7.12 • 2.38
December1974 7.70 2.32 1.34 (June1973to
June 1975 5.64 2.12 December1975)
December1975 5.84 1.38
June 1976 5.30 1.30
December1976 5.23 1.81
June 1977 5.92 1.36
December1977 5.99 1.23 0.66 (June1976to
June 1978 6.40 1.57 December1978)
December1978 6.97 1.75
June 1979 8.31 2.35
December1979 10.14 2.37
June 1980 10.67 2.57 1.46 (June1979to
December1980 10.51 2.58 December1981)
June 1981 8.86 2.83
December1981 6.96 2.21
Source: Livingston Survey Data at Annual Rates.— 14—
centbelow the levels of December 1980. In fact, the rate on six—month
Treasury bills fell by about 2.5 per cent over that period, implying
that after—tax real rates rose considerably during J.98l. Overall, the
behavior of the level of anticipated inflation suggests that, ceteris
paribus, interest rates should have come down during 1981 by more than
they actually did. Further, the rise in rates early in 1982 would be
somewhat at variance with the slowing of actual inflation rates and
appearance of further survey data suggesting a drop in longer—term
expected inflation. 1/
Table 1 also suggests that the volatility of expected inflation
over time has been considerably higher since mid—1979 than during the
period of comparable length from mid—1976 through the end of 1978. The
standard deviation of expected inflation rates during the later period
was 1.46 per cent, or more than twice the level of 0.66 per cent for the
earlier period. This rise may well have contributed to the rise in the
volatility of interest rates since 1979.The rise ifl the volatility
of expected inflation likely reflects the rise in the volatility of U.S.
money growth rates since October 1979, when new operating procedures
were adopted by the Federal Reserve Board.
1/ During February 1982, Manufacturer's Hanover Trust reported a
drop since late 1981 of about 2 per cent in expected inflation
over the coming five years from the 9 per cent range to the 7 per cent
range.
In the second half of 1982 rates on short—term Treasury bills
fell to a level broadly consistent with a tax—adjusted Fisher hypothesis.— 15—
Itis also clear from Table 1 that cross—sectional uncertainty
about expected inflation has risen steadily since 1977. This phenomenon,
as discussed above, may be linked to a rise or fall in after—tax real
rates.
IV. Behavior of the Expected Real Interest Rate
A strict version of the -:sherianrelationship between interest
rates and inflation assumes that the rate of interest rises par passu
with the rate of inflation. In other words, ft assumes that the real
rate of interest is constant. This version received a strong boost
when a particularly influential study by Fiia (1973) failed to reject
the joint hypothesis of constancy of the real rate and rationality of
inflation forecasts. A later study by Nelson and Schwert (1977) argued
that Fama's test of that joint hypothesis was not sufficiently powerful.
After applying more powerful tests, these authors concluded that the
data permitted rejection of the constant real rate hypothesis. Mishkin
(1981) argued that Fama's failure to reject constancy of the real rate
might alternatively be viewed as an artifact of the sample period he
employed (first quarter 1953 through second quarter 1973).
The recent behavior of interest rates is difficult to explain
without recourse to the hypothesis that the real rate has fluctuated
considerably. A relevant question then becomes how to explain movements
in the real rate. Those movements have been substantial, particularly
since 1979 (see Figure 3).— 16—
Studiesby Levi and Makin (1979), Makin (1982b), Mishkin (1981),
Peek (1981), Tanzi (1980a), and others have singled Out many factors
that may cause, at least in the short run, changes in the after—tax
real rate of interest. Among these, the following deserve specific
mention: (a) expected inflation itself; (b) the stage of the business
cycle; (c) unanticipated changes in the fiscal deficit; (d) taxes;
(e) unanticipated changes in the money supply; and (f) uncertainty
about the level of inflation.
We have speculated above on ways in which uncertainty about
inflation might affect the after—tax real rate. And we have already
discussed the way in which taxes should play a role, at the same time
advancing the hypothesis that up to the mid—l970s there was too little
tax effect because of a "fiscal illusion," but that this illusion has
progressively disappeared. This disappearance would, of course, be
translated into an increase in the impact of changes in expected
inflation on nominal interest rates.
Also operating on the measured impact of expected inflation on the
nominal interest rate is the well—known Mundell—Tobin effect. Under
the Mundell—Tobin effect, the real rate can be affected by changes in
expected inflation. A rise in expected inflation causes a shift Out of
money balances and into real capital, thereby depressing the marginal
product of capital and the equilibrium real rate. This is the "Tobin
Effect." Mund€ll (1963) describes a similar phenomenon whereby a rise
in anticipated inflation depresses equilibrium real cash balances, in

















































































































































































































































balanceeffect. Equilibrium is restored by means of a lower real
interest rate, which elevates the level of investment until it equals
the higher level of saving. This effect, operating as it does on the
steady—state rate of saving, is not expected to be subsequently reversed
in the absence of a further change in the rate of expected inflation.
The impact of the Mundell—Tobin effect on the relationship between
expected inflation and nominal rates of taxes can best be understood
with the aid of a structural juodel that determines the equilibrium value
of the after—tax real rate. This approach also helps to clarify the
role of uncertainty about inflation, money surprises, and surprise fiscal
deficits in determining the level of observable, nominal interest rates.
The structural model presented here, which extends the model developed
in Makin (1983), yields a reduced—form equation for the after—tax real
rate. The resulting expression for the after—tax real rate can then be
substituted into a Fisher equation describing the observable nominal
rate in terms of the after—tax real rate and expected inflation.
The structural equations are expressed in the familiar IS—LM format
with some modifications, along with an expression for real income
(output) in terms of a distributed lag on money surprises as derived by





+L5GAPt+e1(i il...5 >0)— 18—
where
It log of nonincoine—induced expenditure
=expected,after—tax, real interest rate
a measure of inflation uncertainty
X log of an exogenous expenditure shift
expected inflation
CAPt =[(actualreal GNP —potentialreal GNP)/(potential real GNP)]
e1=anerror term, normally distributed with zero mean
t (All error terms, ej (i=l,.. .,4) take this form)
Equation (6) describes nonincotne—induced expenditure. As such, it
is negatively tied to the after—tax real rate and to uncertainty about
inflation and positively affected by any real exogenous shock to expen-
diture that is unrelated to other right—hand variables in equation (6).
Expected inflation produces a negative impact on investment owing to the
depressing impact on corporate profits arising from historic cost depre-
ciation rules noted by Feldstein (1976) and Summers (1978). 1/ GAP is a
measure of capacity utilization, or the stage of the business cycle, first
employed by Tanzi (1980a). As GAP rises so does pressure on existing
capacity, signaling a need for more investment. In effect, GAP captures
an accelerator effect on investment.
1/ The depressing impact on corporate profits of actual inflation may
be offset by a reduction in the real value of corporate debt only to the
extent that actual inflation is unanticipated. But expected inflation
will not result in a lower value of corporate debt, since it will be
reflected in a higher nominal interest rate demanded by lenders and paid
by borrowers in the face of an anticipated depreciation of money against
commodities. It will, however, depress expected after—tax profits under
existing depreciation rules.— 19—
Thelog of the sum of real saving, taxes and imports is written
as:
Z o+1it —12(mt—Pt)
—13t+ e2 (11,12,Y3 > 0) (7)
where
Z log of real saving
Yt=logof real income (output)
(mt—Pt) log of real money balances
Equilibrium in the money sector is written as
(mt—pt) =0+ 1Yt 82(11)it + e (8)
Equation (8) takes the after—tax nominal interest rate as the opportunity
cost of holding money.
The supply side of the model represents real inc-ne (output) s
=y+ Z i(mri_lm) + e4 (9)
t i—0 t
where
y log of natural output, written as 0r + 1 time
t
(mç-1_1m)surprise money growth measured as the difference between
the log of the current money supply and the log of the
anticipated (as of t—l for t) money supply
Finally, the Fisher equation is written as equation (3):




t marginaltax rate on interest income
Equations (6) through (9) and equation (3) can now be used to solve
for r. Setting equation (6) equal to equation (7), substituting from
equation (8) for real balances and from equation (9) for real output,
and substituting the resulting expression for r into equation (3)
yields a reduced—form equation for the nominal interest rate in terms
of a constant term, expected inflation, money surprises, uncertainty










[(4r22)/(a11282)] (0 < A1 < 1)
X2((Yl—Y28l)/(al+Y22)] '2 > 0 2/
>
A3E(2—Y3)I(1Y22)] A3 0
1/ It is assumed that money surprises are independent of the error
term in equation (10).
2/ A2 is positive, since l' the elasticity of real saving plus
imports with respect to real income, is unity, given a constantratio of
saving plus taxes and imports to income, while 8i, the elasticity of
demand for real balances with respect to real income, and A2, the
(elasticity) real balance effect on saving plus imports, are both frac-
tions.— 21—
x4 = [3/(rh22)] A4 > 0
A5 [cz5/(cz1+y22)] A5 > 0
Vt =[Ce1—e2+12e3—)'1e4)/ct1+1782)]
tt tt
Thecoefficients on the interest rate equation (10) are functions
of the underlying structural parameters defined in equations (3) and
(6) through (9).It is usefu to note that the measured impact upon
nominal interest of each of the explanatory variables in equation (10)
also depends upon the effective marginal tax rate, t,oninterest
incomes. While the underlying structural parameters are unidentified
(they cannot be measured based on empirical estimation of equation (10))
this framework is still useful for three reasons. First, it shows
clearly why it may be that even with nonzero tax rates applied to
interest incomes, the measured coefficient on expected inflation will
be less than [l/(1—r)] and may even be less than unity. Second,
it clearly shows that the measured impact on interest rates of all
explanatory variables is conditional on the tax rate, r.Since that
rate may vary over time, it suggests a reason for changes over time in
the fit of many interest rate equations. Finally, the derivation of
equation (10) makes clear the theoretical basis for a negative relation-
ship between expected inflation and the expected after—tax real rate. 1/
The impact of expected inflation on the nominal interest rate
reflects a combination of four factors: (a) the Fisher effect, whereby
the nominal interest rate rises by the full amount of a rise in expected
1/ This phenomenon may also arise in open economies where inventory
behavior results in inertia of commodity prices. See Criswell (1983).— 22—
inflation;(b) the tax effect, whereby the nominal interest rate must
rise by more than the rise in expected inflation to maintain a constant
expected after—tax real return; (c) the Mundell—Tobin effect, captured
in equations (7) and (8), whereby a rise in expected inflation depresses
equilibrium real cash balances, in turn elevating the steady—state level
of flow saving owing to the real balance effect, with equilibrium being
restored by means of a lower after—tax real interest rate, which raises
investment to the higher level of saving; and (d) the Feldstein—Surnmers
effect, whereby a rise in anticipated inflation depresses expected
after—tax profits and causes investment to fall. 1r sum, tax eFects
move the coefficient above unity, while the Mundell effect and the
Feldstein—Summers effect both push it below unity. Typical parameter
values for iandA1 indicate an expected value of 0.75 for the
coefficient describing the impact of expected inflation on the nominal
interest rate. 1, rven though tax effects by themselves tend to push
the coefficient above unity, the combined depressing impact of the
Mundell effect and the Feldstein—Summers effect may result in a net
impact below unity. The general equilibrium approach employed here
resolves the apparent "mystery" regarding a less than unitary impact of
expected inflation on interest rates when taxes are considered.
The hypothesized negative impact of money surprises on the real
rate arises from their positive impact on real income which, in turn,
elevates real saving and requires a drop in the real rate to produce
1/ Parameter values which make 3i/3ir —0.75are ai— 0.5;4 =0.2;
12 —0.2;2 0.5; •t— 0.33.— 23—
anequilibrating rise in real investment. This effect outweighs the
simultaneous upward pressure on the real rate rat results from excess
demand for real balances associated with elevated real income. (See
footnote above, p. 20). The effect of money suprises may be contempo-
raneous or it may persist over a number of periods owing either to
stickiness or, more rigorously, to attempts to restore desired inventory
stocks. (See Blinder and Fischer (1981).)
It is important to distinguish between the real income impact of
a money surprise described here and an expectations effect like that
reported by Mishkin (1982). Mishkin reports a positive relationship
between quarterly money surprises and end—of—period short—term interest
rates. The result arises, in Mishkin's view, from a positive icpact of
a money surprise on expected inflation. In contrast, this study employs
period—average short—term rates as a dependent variable in order to
capture the real income impact under way during the quarter, before
comparison of an actual with an anticipated money supply gives rise to
an expectations effect. A fuller discussion of Mishkin's results and
their relationship with results obtained here is contained in Makin
(1982c). An alternative liquidity rationale for a negative --.ationship
between money surprises and short—term rates is discussed in Makin
(1982b) and Khan (1980).
The impact of uncertainty about inflation on the equilibrium,
after—tax real rate is ambiguous as discussed earlier. The negative
impact of uncertainty about inflation on real investment is measured— 24—
bya2 in equation (6). The negative impact on real saving of uncer-
tainty about inflation is measured by in equation (7).The ambiguous
impact on the interest rate is given by X3 in equation (10).
The impact of exogenous shifts in aggregate demand on the after—
tax real rate is unambiguously positive. If there is an exogenous
upward shift in aggregate demand, the after—tax real rate must •rise to
crowd out' private investment in order to restore commodity market
equilibrium. The model represented by equations (6) through (10) makes
it clear that tests of the possible impact of fiscal deficits on interest
rates cannot be conducted by inserting a measure of the actual fiscal
deficit directly into an interest rate equation. Since tax proceeds
rise with income, the built—in portion of deficits is endogenous and
typically countercyclical. Interest rates are typically procclical;
therefore, the coefficient on the actual deficit (measured as a positive
number) term in the interest rate equation will be downwardly biased and
possibly negative. 1/
Expected future deficits have been identified by some as a source
of higher interest rates. However, such effects ought to be confined
to long—term rates. Measurement of the impact of expected future
deficits on long—term rates is confounded by the cyclical biases just
discussed, together with the fact that few actual time series on anything
like a comprehensive measure of expected future deficits exist before
1/ This is confirmed by results reported in Section V. For a thorough
discussion of government deficits and aggregate demand, see Feldstein
(1982).— 25—
1980.Some analysts contend that the impact on interest rates of fiscal
deficits arises only from their impact on longer run inflationary
expectations. Others suggest that expected "crowding out" that large
fiscal deficits imply for credit markets will raise real rates and
thereby raise nominal rates. But for all of these longer—run concepts,
measurement presents a serious difficulty.
One way to avoid these difficulties is to test the impact 1)11
interestrates of unanticipated movements in the fiscal deficit. 1.!
This approach purges the deficit of its systematic component which,
as noted above, tends to bias downward its measured impact on interest
rates. Further, given period—average short—term rates as the dependent
variable, as with money surprises, it is possible to capture the impact
on interest rates of higher—than—expected sales of government securities
during the quarter. This impact should occur before the end of the
quarter, when comparison of an actual thananticipated fiscal deficit
may give rise to an expectations effect. More specifically, a surprise
increase in the deficit may cause market participants to expect higher
money growth and therefore higher inflation.But if this expectations
effect is already captured in the expected inflation term, the surprise
deficit will appear to have no additional explanatory power. The use of
a period—average interest rate as a dependent variable, as noted, avoids
this problem of apparent redundancy of fiscal deficits in an interest
1/ Another way could be to use the full employment budget surplus.
This was tried in place of the unanticipated deficit for which results
are reported below. The full employment budget surplus did not enter
significantly into the estimated interest rate equation.— 26—
rteequation. We expect that a surprise defir. il1 raise the perd—
•verage interest rate.
Once a measure is obtained of the impact on interest rates
surprise intraquarter rise in the fiscal deficit, expressed in ter'
of basis points per billion per quarter, some idea of the cumulativ.
effect over a year of a rise in predicted deficits can be obtained.
The presumption is that if forecast fiscal deficits over a year rise
by, say, $100 billion, the instant impact on interest rates is equivalent
to the present discounted compound impact of $25 billion per quarter in
fiscal deficit surprises over the coming year. Based on estimates to
he reported below, a $100 billion rise in the estimated ainual deficit
aistributed as a surprise of $25 billion per quarter over four quarters
''d raise three—month Treasury bill rates by 40 basis points.
The GAPvariable,as defined above, is positively related to the
":erest rate. A rise in GAPorpressure on capacity produces an
accelerated effect on investment, which, ceteris paribus, requires a
higher expected after—tax real rate to maintain equilibrium [Tanzi,
1980a].
After consideration of all these factors, it is clear from equa-
tion (10) that regression of nominal interest on a constant, a surprise
deficit, a money surprise, GAP, a measure of uncertainty about inflation,
and expected inflation ought to (a) test the hypothesized positive
impact on the after—tax real interest rate of an exogenous shock to
aggregate demand (measured by an unanticipated deficit); (b)test the
hypothesized negative impact of a money surprise on the after—tax ea1— 27—
rateby checking to see if the coefficient on the surprise :s signifi-
cantly less than zero; 1/ (c) test the hypothesized negative impact of
expected inflation on after—tax real interest by checking to see if the
coefficient on expected inflation is significantly below [l/(l—r)};
(d) measure the net impact of uncertainty about inflation on the after—tax
real rate; and (e) test the impact of GAP on thf after—tax real rate.
Contemporaneous and lagged money surprises may depress the real interest
rate insofar as they elevate real output above its natural level.
V. Some Empirical Tests
A report on some empirical tests that attempt to incorporate several
of •the above hypotheses are reported below. These tests, however, will
not be able to capture some of those hypotheses, such as, for example,
the disappearance of fiscal illusion. As a prelude to those tests t
is, perhaps, useful to report some results on the simplest possible test
1/ Besides Mishkin's (1982) expectations effect, some investigators,
including Grossman (1981), Engel and Frankel (1982), and Roley (1982),
have found a short—run "policy expectations effect,' whereby a positive
difference between a consensus forecast and the announced weekly number
on the money supply causes short—run interest rates to rise. The result
is seen to follow from an anticipated tightening of Federal Reserve
policy in response to excessive money growth.
This finding, like Mishkin's, is not inconsistent with a finding
that, prior to operation of an expectations effect, when an actual money
number materializes which can be compared with a forecast, an income or
liquidity effect occasioned by money growth above its anticitated path
will depress interest rates. The dependent variable in the "policy
expectations effect" studies is the change in three—month Treasury bill
yields from 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon, precisely in
order to isolate a pure expectations effect. Detection of an income or
liquidity effect in these studies would require regressing the average
interest rate from 5:00 p.m on Friday of the previous week to 3:30 p.m.
on the current Friday on the current Friday's money surprise. A negative
interest impact via an income or liquidity effect ought to lead the
money surprise. These issues are discussed further in Makin (l982c).— 28—
forthe Fisherian relationship, such as that reflected in an equation of
the type itrt + t where all the symbols have the same meaning
as above. The results obtained are of some interest.
(a) The worst period for a test of this simple Fisherian relation-
ship insofar as proximity to one of the coefficients on expected inflation
is concerned is between the late 1950s and the mid—1970s. For this
period, the coefficient of expected inflation, 8,isbelow 0.70. 1/
(b) If one keeps, say, 1958 as the initial period and extends the
period beyond 1975 to 1981, 3 rises to well over 0.80.
(c) If one keeps the terminal year at 1981 but moves the initial
year beyond 1958, the coefficient of iTchangeslittle up to the mid—1960s,
but then it starts rising. For the period after 1970, the coefficient
of iTIssignificant and substantially exceeds unity, which is consistent
with what one would expect from the partial equilibrium framework with
taxes.
(d) The results are about the same whether one uses 3—month,
6—month, or 12—month Treasury bills.
These findings from estimating the basic Fisher equation suggest
that either security markets do not fully reflect changes in anticipated
inflation or significant movements in the after—tax real rate have,
in varying degrees over separate subperiods, distorted inferences drawn
from estimating the basic Fisher equation. 2/ In the light of the theory
1/ This was a period of accelerating inflation.
2/ They may also indicate that it is not just the rate of inflation
but the change in that rate that may be significant. For example, the
Mundell—Tobin effect may be tied to accelerating inflation rather than
to the rate of inflation Itself.—29—
of interest rate behavior developed in Secti IV, the latter possibility
seems most likely. 1/
Results of estimating interest rate equations suggested by equation
(10) in Section IV are presented in Table 2. Particular attention is
given to implications of proper modeling of residuals made possible by
the use of transfer function procedures discussed in Box and JenkThs
(1970). An attempt is made to check for the possible atrophy since 1979
of fiscal illusion.
The fit of the equation for the full period (equation (2.1) in
Table 2) is displayed in Figure 4. Actual and predicted values listed
in Table 3 indicate that the model tracks interest rates well within the
sample period. Use of the transfer function procedure i lies that the
goodness of fit reflects explanatory power both of the iidependent
variables employed and of the past history of interest r:tes. 2/
Initial estimation of the equations just described resultc in
heteroscedastjc error terms. A Park—Glejser test strongly supported
the hypothesis that error variances grew over time. Therefore, in all
results reported here, variables have been divided by the positively
trended series on expected inflation to adjust for heterscedasticity.
1/ Summers (1982) has argued, however, that nominal interest rates do
not adjust by the full amount implied by the Fisher hypothesis modified
to allow for marginal tax rates on interest earnings. His results based
on both pre— and post—World War II data arise from equations that employ
actual inflation rates in place of expected inflation and that generally
do not include variables to control for movements in the expected real
rate.
2/ Estimation employing OLS with adjustment for serial correlation of
residuals yields nearly identical results. This is not surprising since
this procedure is nearly equivalent to a transfer function with an
AR (1) noise model a:d cquations in Table 2 are estimated employing an
ARMA(1,1)model.— 30—










































































Allequationsare estimated as transfer functions.Residuals aremodeled
model (t statistics, which are shown in parentheses, are all above 5.0).
test significance levels for the first 24 residuals are (2.1) through (2.4): 0.49, 0.21,
0.11, 0.26.
2/ Anticipated inflation is based on Livingston survey data on six—month expected inflation.
Interpolation is employed to obtain a quarterly series.
3/ Money surprises are measured as residuals from an ARNA (0,8) model of money (Ml) growth.
For a full discussion of this procedure and of alternatives, see Makin (1983).
4/ Surprise deficits are measured as residuals from a univariate time—series model of the
government finance deficit measured in billions of U.S. dollars at an annual rate (line 80 of
the U.S. country pages in the Fund's International Financial Statistics).
5/ GAP is calculated from quarterly data on U.S. real GNP capacity estimated by the Council
of Economic Advisors and actual U.S. real GNP.
6/ The "time" variable in equation (10) is captured by the "noise model" of residuals
estimated simultaneously with the coefficients on explanatory variables in the interest rate







3-MONTH TREASURY BILL RATE
E2
PD!TE
60 74 767Table 3. Actual Versus Predicted Values of the Three—Month
Treasury Bill Rate 1/
Actual Predicted Actual Fredicttd
l9f0Qi 3.87 1971 Qi 3.84 4.94
1960 Q2 2.99 3.Ob 1971 Q2 4.24 3.65
1960Q3 2.36 2.45 1971 Q3 5.00 4.81
19ó0 Q4 2.31 2.29 1971 Q4 4.23 5.07
1961Ql 2.35 2.48 1972 1 3.44 3.65
1961 Q2 2.30 2.54 1972 2 .77 4.28
1961 3 2.30 1972 Q3 -..22 3.75
1961 2.4o 2.t3 1972 Q4 4.86 4.99
l9t Qi 2.72 2.71 1973 Qi 5.70
19b2 Q2 2.71 2.92 1973 Q2 6.60 5.7C
1962 Q3 2.84 2.6 1973 Q3 8.32 7.82
1962 Q4 2.81 2.- 1973 Q4 7.50 8.31
1963 Qi 2.91 2.1;: 1974 Qi 7.62 7.26
1963 Q2 2.94 3.0 1974 Q2 8.15 8.61
1963 Q3 3.29 2.97 1974 Q3 8.19 7.84
1963 Q4 3.50 3.40 1974 Q4 7.36 8.27
1964 Qi 3.53 3.63 1975 Qi 5.75 6.07
1964 Q2 3.48 3.56 1975 Q2 5.39 5.36
1964 Q3 3.50 3.25 1975 Q3 6.33 6.03
1964 Q4 3.68 3.88 1975 Q4 5.63 6.77
1965Q1 3.89 3.59 1976 C. 4.92 4.85
1965 Q2 3.87 3.87 19762 5.16 5.17
1965 Q3 3.86 3.95 1976 3 5.15 5.68
1965Q4 4.16 4.18 1976 Q4 4.67 4.91
1966 Qi 4.60 4.48 1977 Qi 4.63 5.30
1966 Q2 4.58 4.68 1977 Q2 4.84 5.06
1966 Q3 5.03 4.79 1977 Q3 5.50 5.65
1966 Q4 5.20 5.05 1977 Q4 6.11 5.85
1967 Qi 4.51 4.77 1978 Qi 6.39 6.78
1967 Q2 3.66 4.40 1978 Q2 6.48 6.33
1967 Q3 4.29 3.57 1978 Q3 7.31 7.27
1967 Q4 4.74 5.04 1978 Q4 8.57 7.84
1968Q1 5.04 5.13 1979 Q1 9.38 9.37
1968Q2 5.51 5.03 1979 Q2 9.. 9.11
1968 Q3 5.20 5.54 1979 Q3 9.o7 10.29
1968Q4 5.58 4.93 1979 Q4 11.84 9.95
1969 Qi 6.09 6.09 1980 Qi 13.35 12.71
1969 Q2 6.19 6.01 1980 Q2 9.62 12.71
1969 Q3 7.01 6.30 1980 q3 9.15 6.91
1969 Q4 7.35 6.96 1980 Q4 13.61 11.44
1970 Q1 7.21 6.66 1981 Qi 14.39 12.82
1970 Q2 6.67 6.94 1981 Q2 14.91 12.75
1970Q3 6.33 5.76 1981 Q3 15.05 12.44
1970Q4 5.35 6.19 1981 QLe 11.75 12.44
1982 QI 12.81 8.35
1982 Q2 12.42 7.33
1983 Q3 .32 6.32
1982 Q4 7.91 5.22
1/Predicted values based on equation (2.1), Table 2.— 32—
Anumber of conclusions emerge from Table 2. First, the coefficient
on expected inflation is in all cases below unity. All of the subsample
estimates of that coefficient lie within one standard error ofthe
full—period result. Second, the money surprise variable produces te
hypothesized negative impact on interest rates. 1/ The GAP variable
produces the hypothesized positive impact on interest rates in a manner
consistent with results reported by Tanzi (1980a). 2/
The impact on interest rates of an exogenous shock to aggregate
demand as measured by an unanticipated increase in the fiscal deficit is
of particular interest. The model presented in Section IV suggests a
positive relationship that would represent the potential "crowdi:.g out"
of private investment widely discussed in connection with large projected
U.S. deficits after passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
Of course, here we are suggesting that only deficits differing from
those projected subsequently to passage of that legislation will produce
an impact on interest rates beyond that embodied ifl projections made at
the time of its passage.
Results reported in Table 2 for all sample periods suggest that a
surprise increase in the deficit at an annual rate of $10 billion during
a quarter (an ctua1 $2.5 billion surprise during the quarter) would
1/ Money surprises are measured as residuals from an ARNA (0,8) model
of money (Ml) growth. For a full discussion of this procedure and of
alternatives, see Makin (1983).
2/ The "time" variable in equation (10) is captured by the "noise
model" of residuals estimated simultaneously with the coefficients on
explanatory variables in the Interest rate equation using the transfer
function methodology.— 33—
raisethe interest rate on three—month Treasury bills by four basis—
points. 1/ This effect may seem small, but it should be remembered
that this is the impact on the short—term bill rate only. Deficit
"surprises" of $20 billion to 40 billion a quarter have not been uncommon
since 1981, and surprises of this magnitude imply annual rates of
$80 billion to $160 billion which in turn would move the short—term rate
by 32 to 64 basis—points. The impact on longer—term rates could be
larger.
Recall that discussion of the expected coefficient on expected
inflation suggested that tax effects tend to push it above unity, and
the Mundell—Tobin and Feldstein—Summers effects tend to push it below
unity. The reported below—unity results are consistent with our hypo-
thetical predicted value of 0.75 based on "reasonable" parameter values.
The significant negative impact on interest rates of the money
surprise term is consistent with reported findings in a number of related
studies. Levi and Makin (1979) report that output growth depresses
interest rates, and Makin (l982a) reports that surprise money growth
elevates output growth. Therefore, we would expect that both variables
!Estimationemploying the actual deficit in place of the surprise
deficit gives
2.187 + 1.067 —0.024(mt——im) —0.251a
(15.57) (7.25) (3.61) (1.60)
+ 0.001 def.t
(1.1)
As noted earlier, the countercyclical deficit combined with the pro—
cyclical interest rates tends to bias downward the estimated coefficient
on the deficit. The result also suggests the enhanced negative impact
of inflation uncertainty, a, on the interest rate when GAP is
excluded from the estimated equation (see below).— 34—
wuldbe negatively correlated with interest rates. Findings are also
consistent with the hypothesis that surprise money growth produces
liquidity effects discussed in Makin (1982b) and Khan (1980).
Uncertainty about inflation was not significant in the presence of
all of the other variables. This is, of course, theoretically possible,
since uncertainty about inflation depresses both saving and investment
sca.dules, Indeed, results reported here suggest that it is not possible
to reject the hypothesis that the net impact on the equilibrium after—tax
real rate of these shifts is zero.
This result differs from findings reported in Levi and Makin (1979)
and Makin (1983) where a significant negative coefficient on uncertainty
about inflation was discovered. The reason for the different finding
reported here may be linked to the presence of the GAP variable, which
was not incl'ied in these other studies. A rise in GAP produces a
si---ificant positive impact on the interest rate. At the same time, it
is negatively correlated with the measure of uncertainty about inflation,
a2 (p =—0.32).The GAP variable is likely proxying for a2 with a
rise in GAP associated with lower inflation uncertainty. No simple
economic explanation for this association comes readily to mind, but it
does reconcile results reported here with the finding reported elsewhere
of a significant negative relationship between interest rQtes and
inflation uncertainty. A rise in GAP may, in addition to its shift
impact on investment, proxy for a drop in a2 which in turn is associated
with higher interest rates.— 35—
Comparedwith the simple Fisher equation, results discussed at the
beginning of this section and reported in Table 2, suggest that the
impact of expected inflation on interest has been remarkably stable
over a number of subperiods. It appears that the variability of that
impact discovered in a number of investigations of the simple Fisher
equation is due to time—varying bias on estimates drawn from equations
that have omitted significant explanatory variables.
VI. Remaining Puzzles Concerning Interest Rates
Still, there remains a good deal about interest rate behavior that
is not well understood, particularly in recent years. Although the
levels of inflation and inflationary expectations fell sharply during
1982, both short— and long—term rates remained high, particularly during
the first half of the year. The inconsistency of this experience with
what our model would have predicted is clear from Table 3. Employing
parameter values of the model estimated using 1980—81 data along with
actual values of exogenous variables for 1982 badly underpredicts
interest rate levels for the entire year.
One possible explanation for this result may have been the very
unusual behavior of velocity during 1982. M—l velocity grew at an
average annual rate of 3.2 per cent from 1950 to 1982, although the
rates of growth usually did fall somewhat during contractions. But
the drop in actual velocity during 1982 was a remarkable 4.8 per cent.
Based on a quarterly time series of M—1 velocity behavior from 1960—81,
predicted growth of velocity during 1982 would have been about 2.95 per
cent. The unanticipated drop in annual velocity growth over the year
was 7.75 per cent, distributed over the quarters as shown in Table 3.— 36—
Table3.1982 A u- Versus Predicted Treasury Bill








• 8.35 4.46 —3.32
II 12.42 7.33 5.09 —0.12
III 9.32 6.32 3.00 —0.86
IV 7.91 5.22 2.69 —3.31— 37—
If,as some, including the Federal Reserve Board, have suggested
(see testimony of Board Chairman Paul A. Voicker before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, February 16, 1983),
the collapse in velocity growth during 1982 represented a large,
unpredictable increase in money demand, then excess money demand may
have been responsible for the very high interest rates during much of
1982. The drop in interest rates during the last half of the year may
have reflected some relief from that excess demand condition resulting
from the rapid acceleration of money growth during that period. The
annual growth rate of money (M—1) was 1.5 per cent during the first
half of 1982 and 15.1 per cent during the second half.
It is tempting to attribute the persistence of high short—term
interest rates during much of 1982, even in the face of lower expected
inflation, to the unexpectedly sharp drop in velocity that occurred at
the same time. However, coincidence does not necessarily imply causality
and it is reasonable to ask if there has existed a stable relationship
between unanticipated movements in velocity and interest rates over a
longer time period and in the presence of the other explanatory variables
in equation (10). As a matter of fact, unexpected velocity growth has,
contrary to expectations, a weak positive impact on interest rates when
included as an explanatory variable in equations like those reported in
Table 2, either for the 1960—81 or the 1960—82 sample period. 1/ When
1/ Unexpected velocity growth was employed in place of surprise growth
of the money supply, since velocity growth is defined as GNP growth less
money supply growth and therefore is likely to be highly correlated with
money growth.— 38—
interestrates are regressed on anticipated inflation together with
velocity shocks alone, the velocity shocks again have a significant
positive impact on nominal interest rates and the level of explanatory
power is comparable to that of equations reported in Table 2.
The inconsistency between the negative association betweenvelocity
shocks and interest rates during 1982 and the positive association
typical of the 1960—81 sample period can be explained as a manifestation
of the identification problem first encountered by Henry Schultz in 1938.
As Schultz discovered, where demand is highly volatile relative to
supply, price, and quantitative measures map Out a positive relationship.
During 1982, a positive shock to money demand dominated money—supply
shifts and the sharp drop in velocity reflected an excessmoney demand
shift which caused interest rates, controlled for the level ofexpected
inflation, to rise. Alternatively, during most of the postwar period
including 1960—81, shocks to money supply have dominated shocks to
money demand. As a result a sharp drop in velocity usually reflects
a positive shock to money supply which in turn produces a simultaneous
negative impact on interest rates while liquidity effects are dominating
expectation effects. The result, consistent with findings reported in
Table 2 on the effects of unexpected money growth, is a dominant positive
association between velocity shocks and interest rates during much of
the postwar period.
In short, most of the shocks to monetary equilibrium which have
caused short—term rates to move beyond or below levels implied by
changes in expected inflation, at least during the 1960—81 sample period,— 39—
havebeen supply shocks. In contrast, 1982 was characterizedby dominance
of a (positive) demand shock which prevented short—term interestrates
from falling in line with expected inflation. Once the situationwas
alleviated short—term rates fell roughly in line with thedrop in expected
inflation. The expected real rate on three—month Treasury bills fell
from 7.09 per cent during the second quarter of 1982 to 3.25per cent
during the fourth quarter of 1982.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to demonstrate a need to expand thesimple
Fisherian view whereby changes in interest rates are explainedlargely
by changes in expected inflation. The need for this expansion became
particularly evident during the early 1980s. Our measure of expected
inflation dropped from 10.5 per cent per annum during the fourthquarter
of 1980 to 7.6 per cent per annum during the thirdquarter of 1981.
Over the same period, average yields on three—month Treasury billsrose
from 13.6 per cent to 15.1 per cent.Some explanation for this apparent
dls:repancy in terms of results reported here may be useful.
The failure of interest rates to display a sustained drop during
1981 as the expected rate of inflation fell steadily resulted froma
combination of forces. During the first quarter of 1981, some downward
pressure on interest rates did materialize, but a sustained fall was
prevented by a rise in economic activity. Our measure of excess capacity
(minus GAP) fell from 5.5 per cent during the fourthquarter of 1980 to
4.3 per cent during the first quarter of 1981. Our estimatessuggest— 40—
thatthis change alone would add about 25 basis—points to short—term
rates.
Rates remained high during the second quarter of 1981 owing, among
other things, to a shift to unexpectedly tight money. (See Makin (1982b)
for a fuller discussion.) This shift by itself raised short—term rates
by about 24 basis—points according to our estimates. Unexpectedly tight
money persisted into the third quarter of 1981, during which passage of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 also added to higher rates. Short—
term rates were 2.61 percentage points above the level predicted by our
interest rate equation during the third quarter of 1981, suggesting that
some exogenous shock pushed up rates. This was the largest positive
residual during the 20 years covered by our sample and seems likely to
be ributab1e to fundamental changes in the outlook for the cyclical
pattern of deficits attributable to passage of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981.[This factor is discussed further below.]
In the fourth quarter of 1981, there was a sharp fall in short—
term rates. This drop was attributable to, among other things (a) a
large increase in excess capacity (29 basis—points); (b) a large positive
surprise in money growth (36 basis—points); (c) a surprise surplus
during that quarter (16 basis—points); and (d) a drop in inflationary
expectations (48 basis—points). The actual drop of 330 basis—points
was greater than the 129 basis—points indicated here, but the discrepancy
is considerably reduced by accounting for the effects of variables other
than expected inflation. In practice, our "noise model," or the past
history of the three—month Treasury bill rate itself accounts for all
but 69 basis—points of the remainder actual drop in rates.— 41—
DuringDecember 1981 and January 1982 there was a sharp acceleration
of money growth accompanied by a rise in interest rates. This would be
contrary to our prediction if part of the sharp increase caine as a
surprise. It must be remembered, however, that the sharp increase
coincided with the first appearance of reports of sharply higher
projections of U.S. fiscal deficits totaling $338.7 billion over
fiscal years 1982 through 1984. These projections, which were revised
upward even further during 1982, suggest another reason for persistently
high interest rates during the first half of 1982. If these figures
materialize, they may well break the traditional countercyclical pattern
historically followed by U.S. fiscal deficits. If the U.S. economy
expands during 1982—84 a rise in fiscal deficits will coincide with
attempts by the private sector to increase borrowing. Traditionally,
in the expansionary phase of the cycle there has been a drop in fiscal
deficits. The perception of a change in the cyclical pattern of deficits
has kept interest rates high since the end of 1981, whereas normally the
dramatic drop in inflation and expectations about future inflation would
have lowered rates. Viewed in this way, it may be that the "surprise"
increase in money growth during December 1981 and January 1982 in fact
cushioned the upward pressure on rates caused by the likelihood of procy—
clical U.S. fiscal deficits coupled witir the then held expectation that
the U.S. economy would recover during the second quarter of 1982. 1/
1/ A sharp drop in interest rates did materialize by August 1982,
when it became clear that recovery of the U.S. economy was to be delayed.
and when monetary policy began to become more accommodative.— 42—
'ina11y,there does exist the possibility that an atrophy of
"fiscal illusion" resulting in a rise in perceivedtax rates employed to
calculatereal after—tax returns has tended to elevate observedpretax
market rates. Such a rise in perceived tax rates wouldmagnify the
impact on observed pretax interest rates of rises in expected after—tax
real rates.
The high volatility of interest rates since 1979 isexplained fairly
straightforwardly by the sharp rise in the volatility of expected infla-
tion (the variance of itrosefrom 0.44 during the June l976—December 1978
period to 2.13 during the June 1979—December 1981 period) and by the
likely increase in volatility of expected after—tax real ratesresulting
from increased uncertainty about the cyclicalpattern of U.S. fiscal
deficits and from pressures created by adherence tomonetary targets.
The elevated level of variance of expected inflationlikely reflects
in part the increased volatility ofmoney growth since 1979. This is
disquieting in view of the stated goal of reducing volatility ofmoney
growth under new Federal Reserve System operating procedures but riot
mysterious in its predictable impact on uncertainty about the outlook
for inflation. Persistent success In targetingaggregates ought to
reduce sharply the volatility of expected inflation. The net result
will be more stable nominal rates even given some higher level of real
rate volatility.
Overall interest rates have remained high since 1980, although
progress in lowering expected Inflation would normally have brought
reductions, because a number of forces have acted to raise after—tax— 43—
realrates since that time. Interest rates have been highly volatile in
response to the elevated uncertainty about the outlook for inflation and
for expected real rates.
These findings suggest a need for further investigation in a number
of areas. Can effects of tax policy on interest rates be considered
separately from effects of other variables? Analysis by Peek (l98l'
suggests that this may be possible. How significant is the perceived
structural change in the cyclical behavior of U.S. fiscal deficits in
pushing up real rates? Is there evidence that fiscal illusion has
moderated and, if so, by how much? Might it be expected to reappear
given a sharp reduction in the level of expected inflation? If higher
real rates persist owing to "crowding out" associated with persistently
enlarged fiscal deficits, what will be the effects on private saving,
on international capital flows, and on private investment? What are
the implications of elevated uncertainty about expected inflation?
And finally and perhaps most important, what are the implications for
the world economy of the unusual behavior exhibited by U.S. interest
rates since 1979? More specific questions include possible effects on
observed and real exchange rates, effects on worldwide economic growth
and capital formation, and implications for the form of the international
monetary system.— 44—
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